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CASES NOTED
necessarily curtail constitutional liberties;25 and when "mass evacuation of
groups from a given area" 26 may be deemed necessary in time of national
emergency.
MILITARY LAW-RE-ENLISTMENT AS REVIVING NAVY COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED
DURING PREVIOUS SERVICE
After the relator had been honorably discharged from the Navy and had
re-enlisted, he was tried and convicted by a general court-martial for offenses
alleged to have been committed during his earlier enlistment. Held, reversing
the order of the district court sustaining a writ of habeas corpus, that since
an administrative interpretation is only evidence of the meaning of a statute,
a later interpretation may take precedence and allow the court-martial to ex-
ercise jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F. 2d
503 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
For seventy years the Navy had interpreted the court-martial statute
to mean that, except for offenses involving fraud,2 a member of the Navy who
had received an honorable discharge and re-enlisted, no matter how soon
afterward, could not be tried by court-martial for offenses committed during
his prior enlistment.3 But in 1932 the Navy adopted an opposite inter-
pretation, which was incorporated into Article 334, NAVAL COURTS AND
BOARDS, 1937.4 It is required that such instructions issued by the Executive
shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy,3 and as such they have
the force of law.6 That this provision7 "was only intended to recognize
the power of the President to alter regulations which he was originally
25. In this respect, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in the instant case, calls attention to
Duncan v. Kohanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946), and E.r parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S.
1866). See also Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).
26. As to this possibility, Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the instant case. cited
Hirabayashi v. United States, supra. See also Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States,
323 U. S. 214 (1944).
I. Articles for the Government of the Navy, 12 STAT. 600 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 1200
(1946).
2. Ibid., Article 14, which corresponds to Article 94 of the Articles of War, 41
STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1566 (1946). The latter was held to be unconstitutional
in United States ex rel Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
3. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 93 (1920 ed.) ; CMO 22-1917, page
7; CMO 12-1921, page 11; CMO 1-1926, page 9; CMO 12-1929, page 7.
4. Issued by the Secretary of the Navy, March 4, 1937, and approved by the Presi-
dent, March 5, 1937. It reads, inter alia: ". . . if an officer reoiters service ... he may
be tried by court-martial for an offense committed during his previous service, whether
or not the offense is one for which trial by court martial after separation from the service
is specifically authorized by statute. . . . Similarly . . . an enlisted man ......
5. 12 STAT. 565 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 591 (1946).
6. See Denby v. Berry, 263 U. S. 29, 37 (1923), in which the Court relied on what
is now 34 U. S. C. § 591.
7. See note 5 supra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
competent to adopt . . .without express authority of Congress" and that
"no just rule of construction would authorize giving to this provision the
force and effect of a general delegation of legislative authority to the Execu-
tive" 1 has never been questioned.
Though omissions and ambiguities in a statute are therefore not to be
remedied by legislation disguised as administrative interpretations, 9 the courts
occasionally precede classification of an executive measure by an evaluation of
the alternative results that would be reached by holding it "legislative" or
"administrative." 10 Here, however, the court made a distinction between ad-
ministrative interpretations, which, as regulations, "extend" 11 a statute, and
those which merely evidence the legislative intent. That the former can never
be done administratively the members of the court agree, but they differ on
the evaluation which should be given the conflicting administrative interpreta-
tions as evidence. The cases would seem to support the majority position that
although official interpretations, announced simultaneously with the enact-
ment of the statute and thereafter long continued, demonstrate a legislative
intent consonant with those interpretaions,12 a subsequent change in construc-
tion or practice may suffice to overcome the force of that evidence.18 Nor is
the court influenced by the fact that prior to 1932 Congress had re-enacted
the Army court-martial statute, which had received an administrative inter-
pretation identical with that of the Navy.1 4
8. 13 Os. An-r'y GE N. 10 (1869).
9. See Koshland v. Helvering, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 298 U. S. 441
(1936), where the Treasury Department's definition of "cost" of stock purchase was held
to have been an invalid attempt to modify the statute, which was silent as to definition;
Lynch, Executrix of Lynch, Collector of Internal Revenue, Deceased v. Tilden Produce
Company, 265 U. S. 315 (1942).
10. See Alaska Steamship Co. v. United States, 290 U. S. 256 (1933), where an
administrative interpretation apparently contrary to the express wording of the statute
was upheld because it reached the most "reasonahle result and therefore the one the Court
felt Congress must have intended.
11. See Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S. 599 (1930).
12. See White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U. S. 32 (1942); see 42 Am.
Jur. § 77 et seq.
13. See Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88 (1904), where the Court upheld the Post
Office Department's reversal of a sixteen year old interpretation of the postal statute
with respect to the classification of certain kinds of matter as second or third class mail:
accord, Association of Clerical Employees v. Brotherhood of R. & S. Clerks, 85 F. 2d
152 (C. C. A. 7th 1936). In the cases holding that administrative interpretations are
controlling (see note 12 supra) of the question of legislative intent, the operative fact
of a subsequent change in administrative construction does not appear. It would be im-
proper therefore to consider these cases as dicta for the converse of the proposition in
the text.
14. See New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200
U.,S. 361 (1905), where the "familiar rule" of statutory construction is stated: " .. .
a construction made by the body charged with the enforcement of a statute, which con-
struction has long obtained in practical execution, and has been impliedly sanctioned by
re-enactment of the statute without alteration of the particulars construed, when not
plainly erroneous, must be treated as read into the statute." Judge Frank, dissenting,
cites this case as applicable to the case at bar, inferring that the Army and Navy court-
martial statutes are so much akin that the re-enactment of one impliedly re-enacts the
other. Albeit novel, the suggestion is entirely reasonable, in view of the probability that
Congress intended that Army and Navy personnel be treated in the same manner.
CASES NOTED
It is submitted that in deciding that the Navy had power to make an
authoritative declaration with respect to the scope of its court-martial juris-
diction, the court construed the statute in an unanticipatedly liberal manner.
Heretofore a growing civil judicial sentiment against the extension of military
judicial power has resulted in a narrower construction."5
MONOPOLY-VIOLATION OF ANTI-TRUST LAWS THROUGH
COPYRIGHT COMBINATION
Defendant, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, a
voluntary association, separated the legal rights' flowing from copyrights
assigned to Ascap by its individual members. The synchronization right, for
use as background music in motion pictures. was sold to the film producers,
while the right of public performance was specifically excepted in the sale of the
synchronization right to the producers, and was sold to the plaintiff motion
picture theatre operators by annual blanket licenses over a thirteen-year period.
Plaintiff exhibitors contended that Ascap's refusal to permit buying of both
rights when purchasing a complete motion picture from the producers,
coupled with the payment of annual blanket license fees to Ascap, violated the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act 2 and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.' Claims for in-
junctive relief 4 from Ascap's practices, and for damages based on past license
fees. were predicated upon both statutes. Held, that Ascap's indulgence in these
practices constituted a violation of the anti-trust laws; but since plaintiff
failed to show injuries, money damages denied. Alden-Rochelle, Inc., v.
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 79 F. Supp. 315
(S. D. N. Y. 1948).
A copyright holder is granted a monopoly,5 albeit limited by statute, in
his work; but the protection granted by law does not extend to a combination
of patents or copyrights effecting a restraint of trade,6 even though necessary
15. Sec Ex parte Drainer, 65 F. Supp, 410 (N. D. Cal. 1946), aff'd sutb nor. Gould
v. Drainer, 158 F. 2d 981 (C. C. A. 9th 1946) ; see generally, Note, The Amenability of
the Veteran to Military Law, 46. COL. LAw REv. 977 (1946).
1. 35 STAT. 1075, 1088 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §1 et seq. (1946).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1946); Westor Theatres v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, 41 F. Supp. 757 (D. C. N, J. 1941).
3. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1946); emphasis is upon the threatened
loss in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
4. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § ?6 (1946).
5. See note I supra.
6. "It thus appears that patent pools in the future cannot be built on a structure
where a license to the pool is all that is allowed, but presumably if any license is offered,
then the licensee must be permitted, if he so desires, to obtain a license to any single
patent." U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 68 Sup. Ct. 915 (1948),. Levi, The Antitrust
Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. or Cr. L. RFv. 153, 181 (1947). "The lawful individual
monopoly granted by the patent statutes cannot be nitedly exercised to restrain com-
petitors." Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. U. S., 283 U. S. 163 (1931) State .v. Creamery
Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 435, 126 N. W. 126 (1910).
